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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Eugene Ray Cobell appeals from the judgment of conviction and 
concurrent sentences of life with ten years fixed, imposed following jury verdicts 
of guilty to rape and penetration by a foreign object. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In November of 2007, 72 year old Cobell was in Boise visiting a sick family 
member. (Tr., p. 392, Ls 11-15; p. 405, L. 24- p. 406, L. 21.) He was staying 
with his niece, Cheryle "Cookie" Zwang, and her family in Boise. (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 
6-10.) Cheryle's 20 year old daughter Danielle and her younger sister lived there 
with Cheryle and her husband Brian. (Tr. p. 27, L. 10- p. 28, L. 7.) 
In the early morning hours of November 12, 2007, Cobell returned to the 
Zwang residence after an evening of drinking with family members. (Tr., 39, L. 
15 - p. 48, L. 25; p. 407, L. 15 - p. 418, L. 3.) Cobell sat next to Danielle on the 
couch, talking to her and eventually putting his arm around her. (Tr., p. 51, L. 22 
- p. 54, L. 17; 419, L. 2-' p. 422, L. 2.) Danielle had fallen asleep with her head 
on Cobell's shoulder when she was awakened by his fondling and groping her. 
(Tr., 55, L. 16 - p. 56, L. 12.) Cobell then threw Danielle to the ground took her 
clothes off, and forcibly performed oral sex on her, penetrated her with his penis, 
and digitally penetrated her anus while holding her head back by pulling on her 
pony tail. (Tr., p. 56, L. 16 - p. 61, L. 15.) Danielle eventually broke away from 
Cobell and made her way upstairs to her family where the police were called and 
responded to the scene. (Tr., 61, L. 20 - p. 67, L. 3.) 
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The state charged Cobell with rape and penetration by a foreign object. 
(R., pp. 17-18.) The matter proceeded to a jury trial where Cobell testified that 
he did have sexual contact with his 20 year old grand-niece Danielle, but it was in 
fact initiated by and consented to by her. (Tr., p. 422, L. 12 - p. 432, L. 4.) The 
jury found Cobell guilty of both rape and penetration by a foreign object. (R., pp. 
70-71; Tr. p. 523, L. 10 - p. 526, L. 2.) Cobell was sentenced to life with ten 
years fixed on each charge, to run concurrently. (R., pp. 80-82; Tr., p. 569, Ls. 
10-19.) 




Cobell states the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Cobell's Fifth Amendment rights 
when it allowed the prosecution to question him about previous 
assertions of his rights and allow the jury to infer guilt from such 
assertions? 
2. Did the State violate Mr. Cobell's right to a fair trial by 
committing prosecutorial misconduct? 
3. Did the errors in Mr. Cobell's trial amount to cumulative 
error? 
4. Did the district court abused [sic] its discretion when it 
imposed, upon Mr. Cobell, unified sentences of life, with ten 
years fixed, following his convictions for rape and 
penetration with a foreign object? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7) 
The state rephrases the issues as follows: 
1. Has Cobell failed to show that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment 
rights by allowing the state to engage in cross-examination conducted for the 
permissible purpose of impeaching the truth of the version of events testified to at 
trial? 
2. Has Cobell failed to establish that the prosecutor committed misconduct in 
closing argument? 
3. Has Cobell failed to establish at least two trial errors that warrant application 
of the cumulative error doctrine? 
4. Has Cobell failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
imposing concurrent life sentences with 10 years fixed following a jury's verdict of 




Cobell Has Failed To Show That The District Court Violated His Fifth Amendment 
Rights By Allowing The State To Engage In Cross-Examination Of Cobell For 
The Purpose of Impeaching His Version Of Events Testified To At Trial 
A. Introduction 
Cobell asserts on appeal that "the district court committed reversible error 
when it overruled defense counsel's objection to the State's questions regarding 
Mr. Cobell's previous assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights." (Appellant's brief, 
p. 8.) He contends that the "line of questioning was designed to prejudicially 
persuade the jury to infer guilt from [his] assertion of his rights." kl Cobell does 
concede that "[although] some very limited questioning about his silence on the 
night in question may be proper cross-examination for impeachment purposes, 
the questioning in this case was clearly designed to provide an inference of guilt," 
(Appellant's brief, p. 13) and the district court erred in allowing the questioning to 
continue over objection. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8, 13.) 
Because the cross-examination Cobell complains of involved his 
statements to the victim's mother and to first responders on the night of the 
events in question which were inconsistent with his trial testimony, it was proper 
impeachment cross-examination. Cobell's rights were never implicated. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Whether the admission of evidence violates a defendant's right to remain 
silent is a constitutional question which this Court reviews de novo." State v. 
Moore, 131 ldaho814,820,965P.2d 174, 180(1998). 
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C. Cobell Has Failed To Show That His Fifth Amendment Rights Were 
Affected, Let Alone Violated. By The State's Impeachment Of His Trial 
Testimony Through Cross-Examination 
Cobell asserts that the "line of questioning [on cross examination] was 
plainly an attempt by the prosecution to have the jury infer Mr. Cobell's guilt 
based upon his previous silence and invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 13.) The record, however, shows that Cobell did not invoke 
his right to silence, but instead made statements to the victim's mother and the 
police. The state therefore properly cross-examined Cobell and attempted to 
impeach his credibility based upon differences between his statements and his 
trial testimony. Such impeachment does not implicate any rights of Cobell. 
Cobell mistakenly refers to factual omissions in his statements to the 
victim's mother and law enforcement on the scene as invocations of his right to 
silence. (Id.) Applicable law, however, allows cross examination about why trial 
testimony contains factual allegations not asserted in previous statements. In 
Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980), the United States Supreme Court 
addressed and clarified this very issue in light of its previous holding in Doyle v. 
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), that prohibited the unconstitutional use of post-
Miranda silence at trial. Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408 (citations omitted). In 
Anderson, the state cross-examined the defendant regarding an inconsistency in 
his statement to officers and his trial testimony and the Court determined that 
"[t]he questions were not designed to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an 
explanation for a prior inconsistent statement." & at 409. The Court held that 
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the omission of facts from the earlier statement did not constitute silence. kl at 
409. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has similarly found that the omission of facts 
from one inconsistent statement of a defendant to another does not constitute 
silence for the purposes of evaluating a potential violation of a defendant's 
constitutional right against self-incrimination. See State v. Wolverton, 120 Idaho 
559, 817 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1991) (prosecutor's cross-examination of the 
defendant regarding inconsistent positions material to the case was not an 
impermissible infringement on his right to remain silent); State v. Rodgers, 119 
Idaho 1.066, 812 P.2d 1227 (Ct. App. 1990) (state's cross-examination regarding 
inconsistencies in trial testimony with prior statements to police was permissible). 
In the present case, Cheryle Zwang testified on direct by the state about 
her interaction with Cobell upon being told that he had raped her daughter: 
Q: So did you confront him? 
A: I did. I said - - I said, 'What did you do?' And he goes, 'Oh 
Cheryle'. And I said, 'What did you do?' And he goes, 'Oh, 
Cheryle' again. 
Q: He called you Cheryle? 
A: Yes. And so I said, 'Stop calling me that.' I said, 'Why are 
you calling me that? You know my name.' Like he was 
trying to distance himself from us, like he was trying to 
pretend we weren't family anymore. 
Q: What did you say to him? 
A: I said, 'What did you do to my baby?' And he goes, 'I didn't 
do nothing.' And then I said, 'What did you do to my 
daughter?' And he said - - he goes, 'We were just - -.' He 
had his hands like this. 
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Q: Okay. You've got your .hands clasped together one inside 
the other? 
A: Yeah. And he would kind of rub them like this. And he 
goes, 'We didn't - - I didn't do - - we were just being close 
and everything.' And I said, 'What do you mean close?' And 
he said, 'We were just being friendly and everything.' And I 
said, 'What do you mean friendly and everything?' And then 
he goes, 'I can't do nothing. I can't.' And I said, 'You did 
something, you son of a bitch. You did something. You hurt 
her. You raped her.' 
(Tr., p. 229, L. 17 - p. 230, L. 19.) Officer Cambron also testified regarding his 
interaction with Cobell in an attempt to determine what was happening when he 
first arrived on scene: 
Q: What was the first thing you asked him that you can recall? 
A: The first thing that I asked him was if he knew why we were 
there. 
Q: What was his response? 
A: He said he knew. 
Q: What did he say? 
A: He indicated he knew why we were there. And then I 
inquired as to try and get some information from him about 
what happened because - - if he knows what happens he 
could probably explain it to me. The explanation was very 
vague, and I had to start digging into it with some leading 
questions. And - -
Q: What sort of vague response did he give you? 
A: The initial story that he explained to me was he was 
downstairs with his - - I guess the relationship is a niece or a 
grandniece - - and the two of them were downstairs. All the 
other family members had since gone to bed after a family 
outing. They were downstairs talking about another family 
member that had been diagnosed terminally ill with cancer 
and then the story would just trail off and he would stop 
talking. 
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Q: When you say 'trail off, how do you mean? 
A: It just - - he would be explaining it and then that would be the 
end of it. He would stop talking. So I would have to ask, 
keep going - - just keep pushing and then what happened 
and then what happened. 
Q: And in that context - - in pushing him a little bit - - how did 
you do that? 
A: I just kept - - like I just showed you. Asking him 'and then 
what happened?', you know, 'who was there?' Asking all 
these questions because there wasn't a lot of information 
offered. So I had to keep asking questions about, okay, well, 
what happened, what were you guys talking about. And 
that's when he described the terminally ill family member. 
And then what happened, and - -
Q: Did it get to a point where you said 'what were you doing 
with Danielle?' 
A: Yeah. I finally asked him, 'Did anything occur between you 
two?' And - -
Q: What was his explanation to that? 
A: Well, he said nothing - - nothing had happened and then I 
got more direct about - - really specific questions as far as 
'did you two kiss?' And he told me that he had kissed her on 
the neck. And then I asked, Well, did you guys kiss on the 
lips?' And he gave a negative response on that. And then I 
went into the sexual questions about 'did you engage in 
intercourse, the two of you?' And he said no. Then I listed 
different types of intercourse, vaginal/penile, manual/vaginal, 
anal. 
Q: What was he doing through all that? 
A: He was denying all of those as I asked them. 
Q: When you say 'denying', what was his demeanor like? 
A: Just sitting there saying no. 
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Q: Did he register any sense of dismay or shock or 
embarrassment? 
A: No, not really. It was just simply stating no. 
Q: Okay. Did you ever ask him or did he ever provide an 
explanation for what - - for what he considered he was doing 
with Danny, Danielle? 
A: He - - after we established that he was kissing her on the 
neck, I kind of pushed more on that topic, as far as I knew 
these two were related. They are family members so I found 
that odd that that would be happening. That's just not 
something that normally occurs, so I asked him questions 
about that and got an explanation of 'we were being friendly' 
is how he described it. 
Q: That they were being friendly? 
A: Correct. 
Q: What did you say with that? 
A: I asked him to clarify what he meant by 'being friendly'. 
Q: What was his response? 
Q: He would just go back to the beginning of the story of we 
were sitting there, she has her head on my shoulder, I was 
kissing her neck, we were being friendly. So I'd keep 
digging about what do you - - what are you describing as 
'friendly'? How are you defining 'friendly'? 
Q: At some point did you actually give him an analogy? 
A: I did. I - - since I wasn't getting anywhere with him asking 
him to further explain what friendly meant, I gave him the 
analogy that Officer Criminen who's standing next to me that 
we were friendly, but he doesn't put my head on his 
shoulders, vice versa. No one kisses each other's neck, but 
we are friendly. So I was trying to give him the idea that 
friendly can mean different types of things. 
Q: With that, did he provide any additional explanation? 
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A: No, it was back to the beginning of the story - - the head on 
the shoulder, kissing the neck and the stopping. 
(Tr., p. 150, L. 3 - p. 154, L. 8.) 
Cobell later took the stand in his own defense and presented a new 
version of events. Cobell testified that he did in fact have sexual contact with 
Danielle, but for the first time claimed that it was Danielle doing the instigating 
and his sexual advances were in no way against her will: 
Q: Then what happened? 
A: Well, she asked me about this kiss again and she said, 
'Show me', and so I kissed her. Well, when I kissed her 
everything went goofy. 
Q: What do you mean went goofy? 
A: She got real aroused and - -
Q: What do you mean aroused? 
A: She opened her mouth. We started kissing and we had our 
tongues in each other's mouth. She turned toward me and 
we were kissing. And it was a long kiss. And we kept 
kissing. 
(Tr., p. 422, L. 19- p. 423, L. 5.) Cobell continued with his new version of events 
to explain how the contact escalated between himself and his victim. 
Q: That's fine. Why didn't you break it off? 
A: We were just locked in an embrace and she was moving 
against me. 
Q: What do you mean she was moving against you? 
A: She was actually making sexual - - she had her leg over my 
leg and I turned towards her and we just continued to kiss 
and it was for quite a while and - -
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Q; Was there any point during this, up until now, to where you 
thought that this was inappropriate? 
A: You know, I thought - - when I thought it was inappropriate is 
when I first sat down and I had my arms around her and I 
thought then about it being - -
Q: You thought it was inappropriate at that time? 
A: Yes. Because to me, anymore, sex is hugging and kissing 
and caressing and - - because that's all it is for me anymore. 
Q: So why didn't you break it off? 
A: Well, I didn't - - that really didn't enter my mind and I don't 
know. You know, I just - - I don't have an answer for that 
other than when she started to react to me like she did, I 
thought, 'Well, she wants sex. She wants sex and I can't 
give her that, but - -' 
(Tr., p. 424, L. 1 - p. 425, L. 4.) 
After Cobell gave his new version of events, the state properly cross-
examined him about inconsistencies between his trial testimony and his 
statements to Cheryle Zwang and Officer Cambron. The state cross-examined 
Cobell about his comments to his niece: 
Q: Okay. And in this night she [Cheryle Zwang] came to you 
and she said 'You raped my baby'; didn't she? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you didn't take the opportunity to explain what really 
happened, did you? You didn't tell her; did you? 
A: Would you repeat? 
Q: You never told her that it was Danny who came on to you; 
did you? 
A: I didn't get a chance. 
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Q: Oh, wait a minute. She - - you were in her room, in her 
guest bedroom, sitting in her home and she is asking you 
questions. 
A: I wasn't in her room. 
Q: You were in the guest bedroom of the Zwang home; right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And when asked if you raped her, you said, 'No'; correct? 
Just yes or no, Mr. Cobell. 
A: No, it was in the hall. 
(Tr., p. 443, L. 15-p. 444, L. 9.) The complained of portions of the state's cross-
examination of Cobell as it relates to his communication with law enforcement is 
as follows: 
Q: All right. And when law enforcement came to the house and 
they told you that they were there because Danny had 
accused you of sexually assaulting her, you didn't tell them 
that story either; did you? 
A: I don't understand. 
Q: You never told the police this story; have you? Yes or no? 
A: No. 
Q: And when you went down and were taken to the detective's 
office and were given an opportunity to explain your side of 
the story, you never offered up any of this; did you? 
A: No. 
Q: So the same - - story that you want this jury to believe, that 
would exonerate you if it was quote 'consensual', you didn't 
tell anybody about it that night, did you? 
Q: No. 
(Tr., p. 444, L. 10 - p. 445, L. 3.) 
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The state attempted to illustrate through cross-examination that Cobell 
hadn't sufficient time to come up with the version of events testified to at trial on 
the evening of the accusation. 
Q: When Cheryle Zwang accused you of raping her daughter, 
you told Mr. Carr on direct examination something to the 
effect of, 'I had no idea it was coming. I wasn't prepared to 
be quizzed that way.' Do you recall that? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that was the explanation that you gave for why you 
couldn't tell Cheryle what was going on, correct? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: Wouldn't it be more fair to say, Mr. Cobell, that you weren't -
- in saying that you just simply weren't prepared with an 
explanation? 
Q: I was shocked. 
A: You weren't prepared - -
A: I was shocked. 
Q: - - is what I'm asking. The truth is the truth. 
A: I couldn't prepare for anything because I didn't know what 
was coming. 
Q: You knew that she was accusing you of rape; right? 
A: Pardon me? 
Q: You knew that you were being accused of rape? 
A: I knew she accused me of rape. 
Q: Right. Cheryle accused you of that as well, right? 
A: No, I didn't know Danielle had. What I'm saying is I knew 
Cheryle had accused me of rape. And I didn't know anything 
else. That's all I knew is that she had accused me of rape. 
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(Tr., p. 453, L. 6 - p. 454, L. 13.) The state further inquired as to why Cobell did 
not tell law enforcement that he didn't rape Danielle: 
Q: So when you are being led away in handcuffs at four in the 
morning and taken to jail, you didn't think then would be a 
good time to set the record straight? That didn't occur to 
you? 
A: No. 
Defense: Objection. Asked and answered. 
A: No, no because - -
Court: I will allow the question because I believe the witness 
put another spin on his answer earlier and I will allow 
the State to follow-up. 
A: Would you repeat the question for me? Okay. You said 
when I was being taken to jail? 
Q: It never occurred to you to tell the police that this was all just 
a big misunderstanding, did it? 
Al: My hope - -
Q: It is really just a yes or no question, sir. Did it occur to you to 
tell them? 
Q: I don't know. 
Defense: 
Court: 
Judge, I'm going to object. The defendant has a right 
to remain silent upon questioning, upon being with the 
police and remaining silent. And Counsel is 
badgering him about that. 
I will overrule the objection. When the defendant 
chooses to take the witness stand, he waives his right 
to be silent and the State can pursue the reason that 
he chose to remain silent on the night of the arrest. 
So I don't believe it is improper cross-examination 
and I will overrule the objection. 
(Tr., p. 455, L. 4 - p. 456, L. 11.) 
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The state continued with its line of questioning regarding Cobell's initial 
statements that he could not have raped Danielle as opposed to having said he 
did not rape her. 
Q: Mr. Cobell, when Cheryle Zwang confronted you and said, 
'You raped my daughter', you told her in response, 'No 
Cheryle. I can't.' Correct? 
A: Correct. 
Q: You didn't say, 'No Cheryle. I didn't.' Did you? You didn't 
say that? 
A: No. 
(Tr., p. 460, Ls. 10-17.) 
Contrary to Cobell's assertion, the intended goal of these lines of cross-
examination was to impeach the truthfulness of Cobell's story to the jury by 
pointing out that Cobell's version of the facts just after the crime made no 
mention of the encounter being consensual or instigated by the victim. That 
version of the facts was first revealed when Cobell took the stand in trial some 
five months later. Because a defendant has no right to avoid being confronted 
with prior inconsistent statements, Cobell has failed to show that his rights were 
even implicated in cross-examination. Further, Cobell has no basis to argue that 
the cross-examination relating to his discussion with Officer Cambron was 
improper because Cobell once again failed to actually remain silent. When law 
enforcement first arrived on scene, Cobell answered questions posed by the 
police in their attempt to gather information about what had taken place at the 
Zwang home. Officer Cambron testified about an actual conversation with Cobell 
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and that conversation took place in the home before Cobell was arrested and 
taken to the police station. (Tr. 145, L. 23- p. 165, L. 13.) 
The questioning of Cobell was limited in scope and was proper cross-
examination. The state was within its right to conduct an inquiry in an attempt to 
impeach--eouell by showing that although he answered questions of the victim's 
mother and law enforcement prior to being taken down to the station, he did not 
come up with the story of Danielle as the aggressor/willing participant until he 
took the stand at trial. The district court was correct in determining the line of 
questioning was proper and did not, as Cobell asserts, invite the jury to consider 
any pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt. Cobell chose to make statements, 
not to remain silent, about what occurred with his victim. As such, the state had 
the right to inquire as to why those statements were different than his version of 
events at trial. Cobell has failed to show that the district court violated his Fifth 
Amendment rights by allowing the state to engage in a proper cross examination 
of Cobell. 
II. 
Cobell Has Failed To Establish Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
Cobell also contends his right to a fair trial was violated by the 
prosecutor's closing argument. (Appellant's brief, p. 14.) He asserts the state's 
argument based on inconsistencies between Cobell's trial testimony and 
statements on the night in question was improper and that the prosecutor 
misstated evidence. (Id.) Trial counsel for Cobell did not object the state's 
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closing argument, but instead argues on appeal that the nature of the comments 
rises to the level of fundamental error. (Id.) Cobell's argument fails as he is 
unable to establish any misconduct. 
B. Standard Of Review And General Legal Standards Governing Claims Of 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A defendant is not entitled to relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct unless he can establish two things: (1) the complained of conduct 
was improper; and (2) the improper conduct prejudiced him. State v. Romero-
Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003). Thus, a mere 
assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was objectionable or 
improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. As explained by 
the United States Supreme Court: "[l]t is not enough that the prosecutors' 
remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned. The relevant 
question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden 
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[T]he touchstone 
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the 
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.") In that regard, the 
Supreme Court has indicated prosecutorial misconduct may occur where the 
prosecutor "manipulate[s] or misstate[s] the evidence" or "implicate[s] other 
specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain 
silent." lli. at 181-82. However, "a criminal conviction is not to be lightly 
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overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the 
statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be 
determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial." 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Thus, the Court must consider 
the probable effect that the prosecutor's argument "would have on the jury's 
ability to judge the evidence fairly." kl at 11-12. Consistent with Darden and 
Young, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a conviction will be set aside for 
prosecutorial misconduct only when the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to 
result in fundamental error. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 507, 988 P.2d 
1170, 1181 (1999). 
With respect to prosecutorial misconduct in the context of closing 
argument the Supreme Court has stated: 
Isolated passages of a prosecutor's argument, billed in advance to 
the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the 
same proportions [as do consistent and repeated 
misrepresentations of a dramatic exhibit in evidence]. Such 
arguments, like all closing arguments of counsel, are seldom 
carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation 
frequently results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than 
crystal clear. While these general observations in no way justify 
prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a court should not 
lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have 
its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy 
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less 
damaging interpretations. 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has reiterated the importance of reviewing 
closing arguments in light of their improvisational nature, noting that "in reviewing 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court] must keep in mind 
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the realities of trial." State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 
(2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 132-33 
(1986)). The Idaho Supreme Court has further recognized "[t]he right to due 
process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but a fair one," and 
the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for 
misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the 
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 
1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Application of the foregoing standards to Cobell's claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct reveals he was not deprived of a fair trial. 
C. Cobell Has Failed To Show Any Error In Argument Addressing 
Inconsistencies In Cobell's Pre-Trial Statements And His Trial Testimony 
Cobell asserts that the state committed misconduct by improperly 
commenting on his right to remain silent in closing argument. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 16-18.) Cobell again erroneously asserts that the only purpose for the state's 
cross-examination on his pre-arrest silence was to infer Cobell's guilt from such 
silence. (Appellant's brief, 17.) Cobell's argument follows that since the cross-
examination was improper, so must the comments relating to such cross-
examination during closing argument be. (Appellant's brief, p. 17.) As fully 
discussed above, the state's cross-examination of Cobell did not even bring his 
Fifth Amendment rights or due process into question. The state properly cross-
examined Cobell in an attempt to impeach him by pointing out the vast difference 
between his own version of events on the night in question and on the day he 
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took the stand at trial. It follows that the state's comments on such in closing 
argument were likewise without error. 
Cobell asserts the following statement is improper: 
When Cheryle, Cookie Zwang, approaches him and tells him, 'What 
did you do to my daughter? You raped her', it is significant, ladies 
and gentlemen, that the defendant said, 'I can't.' He didn't say, 'I 
didn't, I didn't rape her'. Why is that significant? It is not just that 
the nuance of the words because the defendant himself from the 
stand is testifying that what he engaged in he doesn't really 
consider sex. Because apparently he has decided that unless it is 
full penetration, penile-vaginal penetration, that that doesn't qualify. 
So when he says 'I can't' versus 'I didn't', that is not a slip. That is 
not a small nuance. It is a huge thinking error in his head. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 17-18 (citing Tr. p. 482, L. 15 - p. 483, L. 4).) Cobell also 
asserts that a statement made on rebuttal close was improper because the 
statements were designed to influence the jury to infer guilt from Cobell's 
previous silence: 
But for the defendant to say to you today through his attorney that 
he didn't have to explain anything to this family, that he didn't have 
to explain anything to the police, but to just simply come here today 
and give you this dilly of a story is pretty incredible. To want to 
comment that there is a divide in this family with an aisle down the 
middle and to express how painful that may be, when he has an 
opportunity to explain what? That he engaged in an incestual 
relationship with your daughter? And that somehow that would be 
okay? 
Credibility is huge in this case. But ladies and gentlemen, again, 
you don't have to leave that at the door. Where is his shame and 
his humiliation when he takes that stand and tells you this story in 
this fashion? 
He never protests, 'I didn't do it.' He never protests and says, 'I 
didn't rape Danny.' He say's, 'I can't', because he is confusing 
intent with ability. And you should not be persuaded by that at all. 
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(Appellant's brief, p. 18 (quoting Tr. p. 507, L. 21 - p. 508, L. 17).) Neither of 
these arguments was in any way improper. 
Prosecutors have considerable latitude in closing argument and have the 
right to discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising 
therefrom. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003); 
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). The 
purpose of the prosecutor's closing argument is to enlighten the jury and help the 
jurors remember and interpret the evidence. State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 
450, 816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Because Cobell willingly answered the questions of his victim's mother 
and Officer Cambron on scene, giving an entirely different version of events than 
his trial testimony, the cross-examination of Cobell was a proper impeachment 
technique to point out the inconsistencies of such. The state properly presented 
its theory of the case based on the evidence presented. Cobell has failed to 
establish any error by the state in these statements. 
D. Cobell Has Failed to Establish · Prosecutorial Misconduct Based On A 
Stand Alone· Statement About Erectile Dysfunction 
Cobell asserts the state committed misconduct when the prosecutor said 
"[h]e has a problem with erectile dysfunction, but it is situational" in closing 
argument, contending it was without support in the evidence. (Appellant's brief, 
p. 19; Tr. 508, Ls. 19-20.) This was a small part of a bigger point the state was 
making on rebuttal close in response to Cobell's trial counsel's assertion that 
Cobell didn't have the intent to rape because of his erectile dysfunction. (Tr., p. 
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499, L. 25 - p. 500, L. 4.) Additionally, the statement was not objected to by trial 
counsel. Cobell failed to establish that he is entitled to review of this claim for the 
first time on appeal under the fundamental error doctrine. 
Misconduct by a prosecutor is fundamental only if the alleged misconduct 
is so egregious or inflammatory that any prejudice arising from it was not, or 
could not have been, remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury 
that it should be disregarded. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785-786, 948 P.2d 
127, 140-141 (1997); State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d 916, 923 
(1990); State v. Missamore, 114 Idaho 879,761 P.2d 1231 (Ct. App. 1988); State 
v. Ames, 109 Idaho 373, 707 P.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1985). The full context of the 
statement makes it clear that the statement was not calculated to encourage the 
jury to reach a verdict based on improper facts and therefore it was not in 
violation of his due process rights as asserted by Cobell: 
[Cobell] says, 'I can't', because he is confusing intent with ability. 
And you should not be persuaded by that at all. You have nothing 
in front of you to believe that the defendant in fact penetrate Danny. 
He has a problem with erectile dysfunction, but it is situational. 
You know that through the testimony that the Sate elicited in this 
case that the issue about going to the strip bars is important 
because it shows an intent that he has got going on in here. That 
he was very sexually interested and aroused that night. And that 
he was interested in going into a strip bar for that arousal and that 
gratification. That's why it becomes important in this case. 
The fact whether or not he was able to obtain the gratification - - we 
don't have to prove. Only that it was done for the purpose of 
arousal or gratification. That's why the issue of the strip bars is 
important. Because it was on his mind. It was what he was 
thinking about. And that is why he attacked Danny in the fashion 
and manner in which he did. 
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He had sexual arousal. Whether he was able to achieve the end 
and means, we don't have to prove that. He himself told you that 
he was grinding himself on her vaginal opening. 
(Tr., p. 508, L. 15 - p. 509, L. 16.) 
When taken in full context, including that it was a response to Cobell's 
closing argument, the statement complained of does not rise to the level 
necessary to constitute such prejudice that could not have been remedied by a 
court ruling. The statement did not call for a guilty verdict based on improper 
evidence. It was a stand-alone, unexplained statement about erectile 
dysfunction which appears to neither add to nor detract from the state's argument 
that Cobell had the intent to commit the rape of his grand-niece even if he did not 
necessarily have the ability to receive ultimate sexual gratification from such act. 
Cobell has failed to show misconduct, let alone fundamental error. 
111. 
There Is No Cumulative Error 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate 
to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. 
Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Cobell has failed to show 
that two or more errors occurred in his trial, and therefore the doctrine is 
inapplicable to this case. See, M.,, LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 121, 937 
P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial had been shown, they 
would not amount to a denial of due process that would require reversal. State v. 
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Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 
135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors 
deemed harmless). 
IV. 
Cobell Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's Discretion 
By Imposing Concurrent Life Sentences With Ten Years Fixed Following The 
Jury's Finding Of Guilt For Rape And Penetration By Foreign Object 
A. Introduction 
Cobell argues that his concurrent life sentences with ten years fixed are 
excessive given any view of the facts. (Appellant's brief, p. 25.) He contends the 
district court did not give proper consideration to the mitigating factors in the 
case, specifically his status as a first time offender. (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) 
Cobell further cites his advanced age, poor health, and family support as factors 
the court gave insufficient weight to in fashioning his sentence. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 26-32.) Cobell has failed to meet his burden and thereby failed to establish 
that the district court abused its discretion in imposing concurrent life sentences 
with 10 years fixed upon the jury's guilty verdicts for rape and penetration by 
foreign object upon his 20 year old grand-niece. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal, the appellate 
court independently reviews "all of the facts and circumstances of the case" and 
considers the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v. 
Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 500, 129 P.3d 1241, 1249 (2006). To prevail, the 
24 
appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the 
sentence is excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment. Cope, 
142 Idaho at 500, 129 P.3d at 1249. Those objectives are "(1) protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing." 
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). The fixed portion 
of the sentence is considered the probable duration of confinement. State v. 
Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct. App. 1989). A sentence 
that does not exceed the statutory maximum will not be disturbed on appeal 
absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 
P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). Where reasonable minds might differ as to the 
length of sentence, the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the 
sentencing court. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 
(1992). 
C. Cobell Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion 
The district court properly took into consideration the goals of sentencing 
when formulating Cobell's sentence. (Tr., p. 563, L. 2 - p. 564, L. 16.) 
Cobell claims that the district court failed to "properly consider" the 
mitigating factors in his case. (Appellant's brief, pp. 26-32.) Specifically, Cobell 
asserts he was entitled to more lenient treatment based on his status as a first 
time offender, as a person of advanced age, as one who has multiple health 
concerns, and an individual who has ample family and community support. 
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(Appellant's brief, pp. 26-32.) The district court considered all of these factors in 
turn, conceding that the appropriate sentence was "not an easy decision." (Tr., p. 
564, Ls. 13-16.) The court considered "such factors as age, such factors as 
health and such factors as the circumstances," (Tr., p. 569, Ls. 13-14) including: 
First of all, I do not believe that the defendant is feigning his 
physical problems. I have reviewed the prior medical history and 
the reports of his physicians and, yes, indeed, he does have the 
physical problems which he claims to have. And he does in fact 
suffer from the diseases that he claims to suffer from. 
(Tr., p. 564, Ls. 17-23.) Further, the court noted Cobell was "72 years old. You 
have lived a long life. And you have lived apparently a pretty good darn life. A 
lot of people think very highly of you." (Tr., p. 567, Ls. 6-9.) 
Against the mitigation, the court considered the evidence presented at trial 
which resulted in jury convictions for rape and forcible penetration by foreign 
object: 
[T]he defendant was not the only person there that night. There 
were other people in that house. And it was not just the victim. 
Without objection, Mr. Cobell, every individual who was in that 
house that night and saw your behavior and saw the behavior of 
the victim believed the victim. Every one of them. Not just 
immediate family members, but the police, everyone who dealt with 
the victim that night believed she had in fact been raped. So don't 
just say it is a he said she said. Because there were others there 
and every one of them believed the victim's story in this case. 
And ultimately when the matter was presented to the jury after both 
of you had had the opportunity to explain the facts and to testify 
and to be examined and cross-examined, a jury of 12 members 
determined that they believed the victim's story as well and found 
you guilty of both of these crimes. 
(Tr., p. 565, L. 15 - p. 566, L. 10.) The district court also weighed the impact of 
Cobell's actions on his victim. "This young lady who you raped or assaulted or 
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battered, depending on what term you want to use, is never going to have the 
benefit of putting this behind her. Never totally." (Tr., p. 567, Ls. 10-13.) 
The presentence investigator refrained from making a recommendation, 
deferring instead to the district court judge who presided over the jury trial, but 
did include recommendations of the psychosexual evaluator. (PSI, pp. 17-19.) 
Although the psychosexual evaluator concluded Cobell was a low to medium risk 
sexually re-offend, he determined that Cobell did "not appear to be an 
appropriate candidate for community supervision or treatment in the community." 
(Psychosexual Evaluation, pp. 8-9 (attached to PSI).) The examiner weighed 
Cobell's mitigating factors against the negative contributing factors in reaching 
this conclusion: 
It is this examiner's conclusions [sic] that Mr. Cobell is a LOW to 
MEDIUM risk to sexually, violently, or criminally re-offend. He 
scored LOW risk to re-offend on all of the risk assessments and he 
possesses a number of factors and traits supportive of a low risk to 
re-offend. He has a positive employment history, no prior criminal 
history, this is his first documented offense of this type, and he has 
been a rather stable member of the community for all of his life. On 
the other hand, Mr. Cobell continues to deny that he raped his 
victim and does not see a need to obtain any sex offender 
treatment. He places blame on his victim and believes that the only 
person he has wronged is his wife. He does not have an 
explanation for his actions and appears to only be concerned about 
how this offense will affect him and not necessarily the victim. 
Therefore, Mr. Cobell does not appear to be amenable for 
treatment at this time, which in this examiner's opinion increases 
his risk to re-offend. 
(Psychosexual Evaluation, p. 8 (attached to PSI). 
Cobell is of advanced age, does suffer from a number of health issues, 
and appears to have the support of a community. Although Cobell lived many 
decades as a law-abiding citizen, his first run-in with the legal system was for the 
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commission of incredibly serious crimes. Cobell was convicted by a jury of 
raping and using a foreign object to forcibly penetrate his 20 year old grand-niece 
while pulling her head back with her ponytail to maintain her compliance. Cobell 
committed a series of violent acts against a young family member and continued 
to maintain the interaction was consensual. He continued to hold to this position 
following a jury verdict establishing his guilt. Although Cobell points to his low 
risk to re-offend (Appellant's brief, p. 32), he fails to address the ultimate effect of 
his denial on his amenability to treatment and therefore his potential risk to re-
offend. The psychosexual evaluation, however, considers just that: 
Since Mr. Cobell does not accept the fact that he raped his victim, 
he does not appear to be an appropriate candidate for community 
supervision or treatment in the community. 
Therefore, Mr. Cobell does . not appear to be amenable for 
treatment at this time, which in this examiner's opinion increases 
his risk to re-offend. 
(Psychosexual Evaluation, p. 8 (attached to PSI).) 
Cobell has failed to show that the sentences of life with 10 years fixed are 
excessive considering his potential risk to the community based on the 
seriousness of his convictions combined with his continued denial of wrong doing 
and inability to take responsibility for his actions. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court uphold Cobell's convictions 
and affirm the district court's sentence. 
DATED this 29th day of July 2009. 
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